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From the cotton gin until World War II, the pace of economic expansion 
in the American South was principally governed by the rate of growth of 
world cotton demand. From this perspective, many features of the ante- 
bellum Southern economy described in Time on the Cross (Fogel and 
Engerman, 1974, Vols. I, II) need not be viewed as characteristics of slavery 
as a system of production. The profitability and apparent efficiency of slave 
labor, the high regional growth rates, and the sanguinity of slaveowners all 
rested on an inherently impermanent foundation: the extraordinary growth 
of world demand for cotton between 1820 and 1860. As the demand for cot- 
ton collapsed and then stagnated between 1860 and 1900, the economic suc- 
cesses of slavery would not have persisted. In particular, slave prices would 
have declined, the growth rate of regional income would have been dras- 
tically reduced, and much of the superior measured “efficiency” of slave 
labor would have evaporated. 
Cotton Demand and the Projitability of Slavery 
In Chapter 3 of Time on the Cross, Fogel and Engerman establish that 
the 1850’s were a period of enormous profits for slaveholding cotton 
planters, and that the demand for cotton grew rapidly to the very end of the 
decade (I, pp. 89-94). Much of the actual profitability was realized in the 
form of capital gains-an increase in the value of slaves-a fact which sup- 
ports the further proposition that the expectations of slaveowners were 
highly optimistic at the time of secession (I, pp. 103-106). What is not es- 
tablished is that these expectations were justified by the prospective eco- 
nomic future, nor that the growth of cotton demand would have continued. 
In fact, world cotton demand collapsed catastrophically in the 1860’s, a 
collapse everlastingly obscured by the virtually simultaneous disappearance 
of the American supply. Demand grew at approximately 5% per year from 
1830 to 1860; between 1866 and 1895 the rate was less than 1.5%. The im- 
pending downturn in the British textiles industry in the early 1860’s has been 
widely noted; demand had barely recovered to its 1860 peak by the late 
1870’s. Measured from the peak year, demand growth was little more than 
1% per year to the turn of the century.’ 
The relatively high cotton prices of 1865-1880 do not indicate strong de- 
‘These and other assertions in this section are documented in Wright, 1974. 
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mand, but reflect instead the problems of the postbellum South in restoring 
cotton production to former levels. These postslavery production problems 
were certainly real,2 but the course of demand is in a sense a more basic 
cause for the slow recovery of Southern incomes: a faster growth of 
Southern cotton output would only have depressed the price that much 
faster. This stagnation in demand would have constituted a serious eco- 
nomic shock to the slaveowning class, had there been no war and no eman- 
cipation. This is not to say that slavery would have become “unprofitable” 
in any fundamental sense, only that the high profits, high slave prices, and 
high hopes of 1860 could not have persisted. As Ulrich Phillips wrote, 
“What shape [the] downward slope would have taken had peace continued it 
is idle to conjecture. But that a crash must have come is beyond a 
reasonable doubt.“3 
The only point at which Fogel and Engerman address the question of 
post-1860 cotton demand is in the section of Chapter 3 in which they project 
slave prices, in the absence of a Civil War, to 1890 (I, pp. 95-97). They find 
that slave prices would have risen at approximately 1.4% per year. This re- 
sult rests on “two solid facts”: (1) that “demand for American cotton grew 
a little more rapidly than the supply . . . Hence the real price of cotton was 
higher in 1890 than in 1860”; and (2) that “land devoted to cotton nearly 
doubled between 1860 and 1890” (I, pp. 96-97). 
How can we reconcile these results with the evidence on world cotton de- 
mand? A growth rate of 1.4% per year is, of course, well below the pre- 1860 
figure, and does provide evidence of slowing down. But even this much 
projected growth in slave prices is indefensible: it is not based on projected 
experience at all, but on the actual postwar (1890) levels of cotton produc- 
tion, prices, nonwhite population, and interest rates. It is difficult to believe 
that all these variables would have been the same under a post-1860 slave 
regime. The actual cotton production figures, for example, are far below 
any reasonable extrapolation of antebellum supply: hence cotton prices 
would surely have been lower than they actually were. And considering the 
high mortality of the war years and the lower black life expectancy 
thereafter, the 1890 slave population would surely (in the absence of a Civil 
War) have been greater than the actual 1890 nonwhite population.4 
But even using the postbellum figures on supply, price, and population, 
the rise in the real value of cotton output to 1890 is too small to make any 
significant contribution to the projected slave price increase. Almost all of 
2Ransom and Sutch, 1975. 
3Phillips, 1918, p. 375. 
4Ransom and Sutch (1975) attribute the fall in production primarily to the withdrawal of 
labor by the freedmen. The evidence on mortality during and after the war is discussed by 
Ransom and Sutcb and by Edward Meeker “Mortality Trends of Southern Blacks 1850-1910: 
Some Preliminary Findings” Explorations in Economic History (forthcoming 1976). 
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the increase in the Fogel-Engerman projection is attributable to a third 
“fact,” which is not quite so solid: the fall in interest rates between 1860 and 
1890 at a rate of about 2% per year. To believe this result, in other words, 
we have to take very seriously the interpretation of the railroad bond rate as 
the real opportunity cost of Southern capital for Southern farmers. Even if 
we ignore the large regional and local interest rate differentials which 
persisted in the nineteenth century, we can hardly ignore the 25year 
deflation in the general price level: at least some part of the decline in in- 
terest rates might reasonably be attributed to deflationary expectations 
rather than a real fall in the marginal productivity of capital. One scholar 
has recently argued that in real terms interest rates sharply rose between 
1845-1861 and 1867-1878.5 Adjusting only the 1890 interest rate for the 
rate of deflation of the 1880’s would cut the rate of decline in the real in- 
terest rate in half. 
The one component of the projection which might reasonably be assumed 
independent of the Civil War and its aftermath is cotton demand. But 1890 
is not exactly a representative year for computing demand change. Esti- 
mates of the postbellum cotton demand curve indicate that the census year 
1890 is in fact the most unrepresentative year availabIe.‘j Specifically, the 
percentage demand residual (actual minus “predicted” price) is higher for 
1890 than for any other year in the estimating period (1866-1895). This 
untypicality is not quite evident in the chart on page 97 of Time on the Cross 
(Vol. I). The reader can see that most of the projected price increase comes 
after 1886, but he is not able to see that a sharp decline is in the offing for 
the 1890’s. 
By combining the Fogel-Engerman formula with reasonable projected 
rates of change for output and prices, and adjusting the interest rate for 
deflationary expectations, it is not difficult to generate projections of a slave 
price decrease of more than 1% per year for periods of 20-40 years. Such 
projections are highly sensitive to assumptions and deserve skepticism. But 
since all of this discussion concerns changes in equilibrium slave prices, it is 
not implausible to assert that the plunge of slave prices during the cotton 
market collapse of the 1860’s would have been very drastic indeed, in the 
light of the established pattern of overadjustment of slave prices in both up- 
ward and downward directions (I, p. 104). Ramsdell was on strong ground 
in forecasting an era of low cotton prices and falling slave values in the 
1860’s and 1870’s. Of course, there had been a major slave price fall earlier, 
but in contrast with the 1840’s, the slaveholders of 1860 would have had to 
wait more than a generation to see their capital loss fully restored. Even if 
one is not willing to agree with Ramsdell that slavery would have died out 
‘Williamson, 1974, pp. 109-l 10. On regional interest-ratedifferentials, see Davis, 1965. 
‘The estimates are reported in Wright, 1974. p. 629. 
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peacefully under this pressure, it is not going too far to say that the political 
and economic equilibrium of 1860 would have been severely disturbed. 
Was Slave Agriculture More Eficient than Free? 
Time on the Cross advances two types of propositions in connection with 
the productive efficiency of slavery (I, pp. 19 l-209): (1) that “southern slave 
agriculture” was 35% more efficient than “the northern system of family 
farming”; (2) that southern slave farms were 28% more efficient than small 
slave farms. These results are obtained, in both cases, by the calculation of 
a “geometric index of total factor productivity”: the ratio of the value of 
output (at market prices) to an index of inputs of labor, capital, and land. 
All intereconomy comparisons of aggregate efficiency are fraught with 
practical and conceptual difficulties, and many economists view them with 
great skepticism. The NorthhSouth indices of Time on the Cross, in par- 
ticular, are quite sensitive to the assumed commodity prices and factor 
weights. Since prices and factor shares were quite different in the North and 
in the South, any proffered measure of relative efficiency is bound to be 
somewhat arbitrary. Among the debatable procedures employed, however, 
the most significant for the calculation is the use of land values (rather than 
acreage) to reflect differences in soil quality. This alteration accounts for 
most of the large efficiency advantage enjoyed by the South under the 
“refined” (as opposed to the “crude”) index (II, pp. 13 l-138). The use of 
land values is dubious because it imparts a conceptual circularity to the 
whole exercise: economic theory suggests that any neutral regional 
difference in efficiency will be capitalized in the price of land, perhaps the 
more so in the North, where labor was not also capitalized. Further, land 
prices are affected by locational influences such as proximity to cities and 
access to transportation, influences which are not part of “output” as 
measured by Fogel and Engerman, and which tend to bias the ratio against 
the North. Some correction of the acreage total may be called for to reflect 
the higher fraction of improved land in the North; but even taking the ex- 
treme step of excluding all unimproved acreage does not yield nearly a 35% 
efficiency advantage for the South. 
Cotton demand and supply also have an important role to play in the 
efficiency calculation. David and Temin make the essential theoretical point 
that one cannot define “productive efficiency” in a meaningful way where 
the production of one commodity is entirely limited for reasons of geog- 
raphy to one of the regions involved. 7 It is true that in principle this 
difficulty afflicts all international comparisons of production. But for 
diversified industrial economies, one might be willing to suspend one’s dis- 
belief sufficiently to imagine a kind of generalized jelly called “output,” 
which can be compared among countries. This conception is not very 
?David and Temin, 1974, pp. 774-778. 
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persuasive when a major component of “output” is a regionally distinct 
primary product. Hence, as David and Temin maintain, the regional index 
of total-factor productivity is not a meaningful basis for drawing inferences 
about the relative hardworkingness of slave and free labor, nor the relative 
efficiencies of the “plantation-slavery system” and the “family-farm 
system.” 
Putting aside the empirical objections, however, one may still view these 
indices as generalized measures of the extraordinary economic success of 
the slave economy in the census year 1859-1860. But even if we adopt this 
less-far-reaching interpretation, it is relevant to take note of just how 
unusual and unrepresentative the census year 1859-1860 was. Econometric 
estimates of the cotton demand curve indicate that the actual cotton price 
for the crop year 1859-1860 was between 7.6% and 15.9% above the level 
“predicted” by the function.8 This is another way of saying that demand 
was unusually high in that year. Bear in mind that this “residual” is from a 
demand curve which includes a trend of approximately 5% per year. The 
corresponding residual for supply ranges from 11.6% to 23.6% depending 
on the specification of the supply curve, on top of an annual growth rate of 
almost 6% per year.9 
In the light of both the trends and the upward deviation from the trends, 
in short, there is no other year which would put the South in a better light in 
terms of the Fogel-Engerman version of “efficiency.” Note that this is not 
the same as saying that the cotton price was exceptionally high, historically 
speaking. Because both supply and demand shifted dramatically, the price 
was only slightly above average. But that does not mean that the crop year 
was an ordinary one in the relevant sense. Its extraordinary character may 
be seen graphically in the sharp peaks in both supply and demand (I, Fig. 28, 
p. 92) in 1860. It is just this peak year which provides the one observation 
for comparison of total-factor productivity between regions. 
Production estimates for Northern crops are not available on an annual 
basis, but the annual data which are available show plainly that neither sup- 
ply nor demand conditions for the North during 1859-1860 were in any way 
comparable to those in the South. Far from being above the trend, exports 
of wheat, flour, and corn were well below both previous and subsequent 
levels in absolute terms.‘O Figures on internal shipments show no unusual 
level of activity for the census year. l1 Northern farm prices were no better 
than “moderate” compared to the average for the 1850’s, though they were 
*Wright, 1974, p. 629. 
QThe aggregate cotton supply curves may be found in Wright, 1969. 
‘%ee U.S. Census, 1860, pp. cxi-cxii. 
“See, for example, Berry, 1943, pp. 168, 172; U.S. Census, 1860, pp. cxliv-clii; North, 1961, 
pp. 251-254. The census year production is presumably reflected primarily in the 1859 annual 
figures, which are particularly low. 
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higher than in earlier census years. In any case it is not safe to take national 
price averages as indicators of the state of demand for northern crops. 
Compared to cotton, prices of food crops varied much more widely among 
major markets, increasingly so in 1859-1860. On the general prosperity of 
Western agriculture, Berry refers to the period 1860-1861 as a “low-water 
mark” (p. 530). One of the best general indicators of agricultural prosperity 
is the value of public land sales, which stood at a peak for the South in 1859, 
while the Northwest approached a trough.12 
It is the deviation of demand from its trend which chiefly affects the ag- 
gregate regional efficiency index. Because of the dominance of world cotton 
markets by American cotton, short-run fluctuations in supply were 
generally accompanied by roughly proportional inverse changes in price; the 
enormous census year crop would have depressed the price, had it not been 
for the unusually strong demand. In a situation where the demand elasticity 
is close to unity, it is on/y demand that can expand the aggregate value of 
cotton production. Comparisons within the South are also affected by cot- 
ton demand-obviously so, since it is only in the great staple crops that 
Fogel and Engerman claim to have found a productivity advantage to slave 
labor-but here supply-side fluctuations may be more crucial. In the 
context of high demand, much of the intra-South pattern of “efficiency” can 
be explained by the deviation of supply from its trend. 
The bumper crop of the census year was especially good in the “New 
South.” A cotton supply curve estimated for the leading New South cotton 
states only (but excluding Texas) shows a spectacular 40-year average an- 
nual growth rate of 7% per year. l3 Even from this supply curve, the census 
year 1859-1860 shows a positive residual between 35.2% and 43.5%. Small 
wonder that Fogel and Engerman find a substantial “total-factor-produc- 
tivity” advantage for the New over the Old South (I, pp. 194-196; II, pp. 
138-140). Other reviewers have commented on how unreasonable it would 
be to infer that New South slaves worked harder than Old South slaves.14 
Attention to the peculiarities of the census year resolves this problem, but it 
casts further doubt on the wisdom of drawing such inferences in general. 
The exceptional cotton crop of 1859-1860 is also crucial for the com- 
parison of farms and plantations of various sizes within the South. The 
“total-factor-productivity” indices do not compare productivity in cotton, 
12North, 1961, p. 256. Berry (1943) notes the increasing price divergence among major 
markets in 1859 and 1860 (p. 528). It is true that Berry’s series on “Western States Terms of 
Trade” shows a peak in 1859 (North, 1961, p. 255), but these high prices prevailed for the first 
half of the year only (Berry, 1943, p. 505) and did not apply to the census year crop. 
i3The five-state supply curve is reported in Wright, 1971. The main states are Alabama, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Unfortunately, since the states were grouped for the 
purpose of using land-sales data, the series also includes Florida cotton production, but this is 
a trivial share of the total. 
“Lichtman, 1974, p. 24. 
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TABLE I 
Value of Cotton/(Value of Cotton + Value of Corn) 
Slaves per farm 
Region 0 l-15 16-50 51 and over 
Cotton South 0.300 0.40 I 0.556 0.66 I 
Old South 0.269 0.373 0.492 0.605 
New South 0.312 0.422 0.599 0.698 
Source: Parker-Gallman sample, 1860. The figures are unweighted averages of the farm 
ratios in each class. Cotton is valued at lOe per pound, corn at 804 per bushel. 
but in the total value of output, where the composition of output varies 
systematically among farms. Small free Southern farms were not geo- 
graphically debarred from cotton growing, but in fact they did specialize 
much more in noncotton crops and in livestock than the large plantations. 
This contrast may be illustrated crudely by measuring the share of cotton 
output in the cotton-corn total, for the size and regional groupings used by 
Fogel and Engerman (Table 1). 
An investigation of patterns of labor productivity (using the same 1860 
sample) yields three suggestive results:15 (a) the value of output per worker 
in 1860 is dominated by the share of cotton in total output; (b) when the 
crop mix is held constant, there is no productivity advantage for slave labor, 
and there are no scale economies for slave plantations; (c)if we assume that 
there were no true differences in labor productivity, the crop mix effect 
alone can generate a pseudoefficiency index very similar to the Fogel- 
Engerman total-factor-productivity figures.16 The Fogel-Engerman 
“efficiency” index thus appears to be largely a measure of who happened to 
be growing cotton during the most extraordinary cotton year of the nine- 
teenth century. 
The application of the Fogel-Engerman procedure to earlier antebellum 
years would produce a reduced measure of the “efficiency advantage” of 
slavery, but quite possibly this measured advantage would not be com- 
pletely eliminated. Hence, the question arises, Why did small and slaveless 
farms grow so much corn, when cotton apparently offered higher returns? 
ISThese conclusions are based on linear regressions of the log of output value on the cotton 
share in output, and an index of soil quality. The “pseudoefficiency index” was generated by 
assuming that the coefficient of the cotton share was 1.0, i.e., that a one-percentage-point rise 
in the cotton share produced a I % rise in the value of output per worker. This is roughly the 
value indicated by the regressions. Obviously, the labor productivity evidence does not 
constitute a replication of the total-factor-productivity results, but the two will be propor- 
tional, ceteris paribus, under the CobbDouglas specification. 
“‘The only instance where the crop-mix effect is not in the same direction as the Fogel- 
Engerman efficiency index is the case of farms with more than 50 slaves in the New South. 
Ironically, this is the one case where Fogel and Engerman believe that measurement error has 
contaminated their results (II, pp. 140-141). They suggest that a corrected set of results would 
show this to be the most efficient class. 
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A major part of the answer lies in the fact that corn and hogs were produced 
for household consumption, while cotton was grown for the market. Small 
farmers, with low reserves and uncertain ability to borrow, were reluctant 
to commit themselves unduly to cash-crop production, following instead 
the popular advice: Achieve self-sufficiency in food first, grow cotton as a 
“surplus” crop. Such a “safety-first” strategy implies, under reasonable 
assumptions, that small farms will have to allocate a larger share of their 
acreage and time to nonmarket production, even if large plantations also 
typically strive for self-sufficiency. The basic underlying motivation is the 
desire to stay out of debt and protect the security of the family’s sustenance 
and property. It is a reasonable strategy economically because-when one 
takes into account the combined risks of cotton yields, cotton prices, and 
the exchange of cotton for corn-growing cotton was a much riskier way to 
feed one’s family than growing corn for on-farm consumption. Indeed, al- 
most one-fourth of the farms in the Parker-Gallman sample did not grow 
cotton at all, and many others grew only small amounts, apparently 
treating it as a “surplus” crop in the sense suggested here.17 
This analysis puts a different perspective on the observation that large- 
scale plantation agriculture occurs only with slave labor, never with free 
labor (I, p. 234). If we reject the notion of a “special advantage” in produc- 
tivity, then there is nothing paradoxical about the absence of large-scale 
free-labor farms, because they were not observed anywhere in nineteenth- 
century American agriculture. The argument presented here is merely a 
variant on the classic explanation of the economic basis for slavery: In a 
world of land abundance and independent, self-sufficient farms, there is no 
supply of permanent wage labor in agriculture. The universal preference for 
farm ownership may well have a “nonpecuniary” component, but farmers 
also valued the economic security which land ownership provided, and they 
also enjoyed the earnings of the land and the prospect of realizing large 
capital gains from an increase in land values. For reasons such as these, 
farms throughout the United States were essentially limited to the family 
labor force, only occasionally making use of uncertain, hard-to-find, and 
frequently temporary hired labor. The “economic significance of property 
rights in man” was to provide an elastic labor supply to the individual farm, 
allowing an expansion under constant returns to scale, which was not 
possible in the free states. I8 If this analysis is correct, then it is inappro- 
“For elaboration on the safety-first model and further documentation on its application to 
the South, see Kunreuther and Wright, 1974; Wright and Kunreuther, (1975). 
ISThis analysis follows closely the more detailed presentation of Fleisig (forthcoming). 
Fleisig traces the implications for factor proportions and farm scale of a constraint on the 
labor supply at the farm level, and finds empirical support in census averages. On the univer- 
sality of the sharp break between family and nonfamily labor, see Parker, 1972, esp. pp. 393- 
398. 
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priate to compare realized pecuniary incomes between small farms and 
large slave plantations (i.e., to value outputs at market prices), because 
most small farmers were intentionally sacrificing expected pecuniary in- 
come for security-precisely for the purpose of protecting their property 
ownership and their status as independent farmers. 
The Cotton Boom and the Growth of Southern Incomes 
Perhaps the most important implications of the analysis proposed here 
concern the explanation for the course of Southern regional progress before 
and after the Civil War. Several scholars have questioned the sustainability 
of the high growth rates observed between 1840 and 1860, on the grounds 
that these rates were very largely a function of the redistribution of popu- 
lation from east to west.lg In Time on the Cross, Fogel and Engerman re- 
spond to this criticism by noting that differences in sectoral or subregional 
growth rates are a perfectly normal feature of economic growth, and that 
studies of twentieth-century experience also attribute a substantial share of 
productivity growth to intersectoral shifts. Their discussion may be some- 
what misleading in that it fails to distinguish between the general phe- 
nomena of sectoral unevenness and responsiveness to change, and the par- 
ticular phenomenon of a once-for-all contribution to growth from the 
closing of a disequilibrium “gap” between sectors or regions. Just as sec- 
toral shifts have often been a part of economic development, so also have 
high growth rates often proved ephemeral when based on a nonrenewable 
resource or “gap.” The citation of the research of Edward Denison seems 
particularly misplaced, since one of the central themes of Why Growth 
Rates Di@r is precisely the argument that some very high growth rates 
recently observed should be discounted somewhat, because they rest on the 
transfer of labor from traditional to modern sectors, and hence cannot be 
sustained indefinitely. Thus, despite their verbal skills and powers of persua- 
sion, Fogel and Engerman have not really addressed or disposed of their 
critics’ objections that the growth achievement of the South is less substan- 
tial than the overall growth rate implies. 
The issue of impermanence, however, runs deeper than the question of 
migration. The more fundamental underpinning of much of this growth is, 
again, the rapid but essentially temporary growth in world demand for cot- 
ton. The reason that regional migration makes such a large contribution to 
growth between 1840 and 1860 is that per capita income in the West South 
Central region is more than twice as great as in the South Atlantic and East 
South Central regions. These high income levels do not represent a more 
“advanced” state of economic development in the West, but reflect pri- 
marily the superior soil and climate of that region in terms of cotton 
production. Hence the real source of growth was not so much migration as 
19Parker, 1970, p. 119; Woodman, 1972 
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cotton demand. Correspondingly, the income decline of the Western region 
between 1860 and 1880 exceeded that of the two Eastern regions by a wide 
margin. 
In addition to the effects of the rapid average annual growth of cotton de- 
mand during the late antebellum period, the measured growth rate of per 
capita income between 1840 and 1860 is probably increased by the par- 
ticular state of demand during the two census years involved. Econometric 
estimates of the cotton demand curve indicate, as noted above, that demand 
was above its trend value in 1859-1860 (i.e., that the price of cotton was 
above the level “predicted” on the basis of production and trend) by 7.6% to 
15.9%. On a comparable basis, the cotton price for the census year 1839- 
1840 was between 4.0% and 11.5% below its predicted value. Hence, it ap- 
pears that over and above the rapid average growth of cotton demand, the 
choice of endpoints imposed by the census data makes 1.7% per year a 
trough-to-peak figure, giving an extra upward “tilt” to the Southern growth 
path.20 
There is no getting around the fact that incomes earned in cotton were 
fundamentally governed by demand. But trends in productivity in cotton 
growing are not irrelevant to regional income growth, because resources re- 
leased from cotton can be used to produce other outputs. Much of the loss 
of income between 1860 and 1880 resulted from lower production of 
noncotton crops, because a larger fraction of Southern resources went into 
cotton-growing, and self-sufficiency in food was abandoned. The possi- 
bilities for alternative crop production were actually quite limited-most of 
the region had no other cash crop-but the trends in cotton productivity 
bear close examination anyway, because they at least were subject to the 
influence of Southerners, which was not true of demand and may not have 
been true of the choice of crops. 
Fogel and Engerman maintain that improvements in the efficiency of 
management, especially labor management, were “the most important 
technological advance within the agricultural sector of the South after 
1800” (I, p. 199). They point to the “substantial increase in the average size 
of slaveholdings” during this period (I, p. 200), a development which, in 
conjunction with the total-factor-productivity estimates, clearly implies 
significant productivity growth over time.21 In this way Time on the Cross 
*OThe same cannot be said for the Northern figures. As North states: “The years from 1858 
to 1861 present no picture of booming expansion” (North, 1961, p. 255). 
*lFogel and Engerman do acknowledge briefly that the “changing structure of demand” (my 
italics) explains the migration of slave labor among states, and they note also that the expan- 
sion of scale “coincided” with a “shift from the production of grain and tobacco to cotton, 
sugar, and rice” (I, pp. 199-200). But the bulk of their discussion deals with the development of 
managerial skills and techniques, and while it is not specific on the point, it strongly implies 
that management was becoming increasingly efficient. That they do have an increase in 
efficiency in mind is acknowledged explicitly at several points (I, p. 93; II, p. 86). 
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conveys the impression of rapid technical progress and major gains in 
efficiency; but, remarkably, the book contains little discussion and virtually 
no evidence on the rate or sources of productivity growth over time.22 In 
fact, there is very little evidence of substantial productivity growth under 
slavery-other than that associated with the increase in the quantity and 
quality of cotton land. 
The one specific piece of evidence presented by Fogel and Engerman to 
support a claim of efficiency improvement over time is the slow downward 
long-run trend in the price of cotton of 0.71% per year (1, p. 91; II, p. 86). 
But there is only a casual effort to list the reasons for this rather modest de- 
cline. As they note, the list would have to include such items as the “reduc- 
tion in transportation and other marketing costs, and the relocation of cot- 
ton production in the more fertile lands of the New South” (1, p. 93). Surely 
there is little basis here for a claim of major improvements in productive 
efficiency over time. To the contrary, it is difficult to see how there could 
be much room left for the contributions of “scale expansion” and “ad- 
vancement in the realm of management,” when the more obvious develop- 
ments in location and transport are taken into account. 
In an earlier publication, Fogel and Engerman did refer to the produc- 
tivity estimates of Foust and Swan from the 1850 census, which imply that 
output per worker grew at 2.9% per year during the 1850’~~~ The authors 
calculated that this growth was too rapid to be explained by an expansion of 
acreage and must imply an increase in efficiency.24 Unfortunately, the cal- 
culation by which this conclusion was reached was erroneous.25 Further- 
more, the Foust-Swan productivity figures contain a puzzling anomaly: a/l 
of the growth is concentrated in the “Alluvial” and “Other New South” 
regions; the “Old South” showed virtually no gain. This anomaly, and 
perhaps the entire increase, may be explained in terms of random fluctua- 
a2The only exception is a reference to a 1947 U.S. Department of Agriculture study (Mis- 
cellaneous Publications No. 630) which offers a completely unsubstantiated figure of 0.79% 
per year for the period 1800-1840 (II, p. 86). For what it is worth, all of the productivity gain in 
this estimate is due to a fall in man hours per acre. 
2aFoust and Swan, 1970, pp. 4445. 
Z4Fogel and Engerman, 1971, p. 315. 
Z5From estimates of factor shares and population growth, Fogel and Engerman computed 
the implied rate of growth of cotton acreage under the assumption of constant efficiency. They 
found that, if there were no change in efficiency, 2.9% productivity growth implies that land 
must have increased by 3.4 times between 1850 and 1860 (? = 12.1%, not 15.1% as the foot- 
note reports). They argue that this is an unreasonably large increase in cotton acreage. Ap- 
parently, however, they erroneously added the 1860 acreage estimate to the 1850 figure to ob- 
tain their figure of 19,000,OOO required acres, when they should have subtracted the two. The 
actual implied acreage expansion is 10,100,OOO acres, which is almost exactly equal to the in- 
crease in improved acreage in the seven states during these 10 years (10,080,000 acres). This is 
with no allowance for improvement in average land quality, nor for the random yield fluctua- 
tions discussed in the text. 
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tions in yields around their normal levels, interpreted as deviations from the 
long-run supply function. As noted above, cotton supply was well above its 
predicted level in the census year 1860, especially in the New South; by 
contrast, in the census year 1850 New South output was at or slightly below 
its predicted level, while aggregate output was between 5.8% and 19.7% 
below. In other words, Old South yields must have been below normal in 
1849-1850, and at or below normal in 1859-1860; New South yields were 
normal or below in the first year, far above normal in the second. Hence, it 
appears that virtually all of this alleged “productivity growth” is at- 
tributable to the accidental characteristics of the census years, which may 
even cover up declining productivity in the Old South. 
We are left with the conclusion that the primary dynamic force driving 
the Southern economy in the nineteenth century was the expansion of cot- 
ton demand. Discussions ofjust how “backward” the South was in 1860 are 
beside the main point, which is the dependent character of the Southern 
economy, its need for an outside stimulus to maintain continued growth. 
Viewed in these terms, the slave South should be grouped with those 
economies which exhibit rapid growth during a period of high external de- 
mand for a resource-intensive export, but which do not develop the institu- 
tions or acquire the skills needed for sustained growth once this era has 
passed.26 Because the cotton boom was not sustained, and could not have 
been sustained indefinitely, a post-1860 slave South would have suffered 
many of the development problems actually experienced by the postslavery 
South. There were many missed opportunities after the war, for the South 
and for the nation, in terms of racial justice and economic equity. But the 
best opportunities for basic economic improvement had long since been 
foreclosed by the patterns of development under slavery. 
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